

Rumors Across Borders: How Transnational Ties and Social Media Shape Latino Belief in Misinformation and Support for Trump

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Abstract

How do transnational information environments shape political attitudes and behavior? I argue that individuals embedded in cross-border social networks encounter distinct information environments that shape what political information they are exposed to and, under certain conditions, what they come to believe. I develop this theory through the case of growing Latino support for Donald Trump. Latinos are disproportionately embedded in transnational information environments sustained by cross-border social ties. These environments expand exposure to political information circulating across national borders, including political misinformation. Social media conditions whether that misinformation is accepted as credible. Belief in misinformation, in turn, is associated with more favorable evaluations of Trump and a greater likelihood of reporting a 2020 vote for Trump or intended support in 2024. I test the theory using an original 2024 YouGov survey with a Latino oversample. Transnational ties are robustly linked to misinformation exposure, and misinformation belief is robustly linked to Trump support and 2020 Trump vote. The conditional role of social media in shaping belief is consistent with the theory but sensitive to model specification. These findings suggest that transnational information environments are an important source of heterogeneity in political information exposure and demonstrate the value of distinguishing exposure from belief in theories of political behavior and political communication.

Keywords: *Latino Politics, Misinformation, Transnational Ties, Social Media Use, Information Environments.*

Word Count 8,077

Existing theories of political behavior often assume that citizens encounter political information through purely domestic information environments. However, this assumption leaves an important source of information heterogeneity underexplored: social networks that extend across national borders and expose individuals to political content that circulates beyond the United States. This is particularly relevant for Latinos, who are likely to maintain cross-border ties. The heterogeneity in their information environment offers a new explanation for a consequential puzzle: the increase in Latino support for Trump despite his xenophobic rhetoric and anti-Latino policies.

The puzzle is striking. In 2024, 48% of Latinos supported Trump in the presidential election, compared to 32% in 2020 and 28% in 2016 (Fraga, Velez and West, 2025; Pew Research Center, 2018, 2025; Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2020). Such an increase is especially surprising because a substantial share of the group are first-, second-, or third-generation Americans, and immigration is a salient political issue for many (Branton, 2007; Sanchez, 2006). Yet, support increased despite Trump’s repeated anti-Latino rhetoric and the restrictive immigration policies implemented during his administration.

Many of the explanations offered for this puzzle involve personal characteristics, such as ideology, economic concerns, religiosity, and beliefs about gender norms. For instance, some scholars argue that Latinos hold conservative cultural and economic values that ultimately align them with the Republican Party, so recent voting behavior can be explained under an ideological sorting lens (Fraga, Velez and West, 2025; Cortina and Rottinghaus, 2022). Yet others argue that Latinos concerned about the state of the economy were more likely to support Trump (Garcia-Rios et al., 2025). Religious affiliation and gendered norms are emphasized by other scholars, as evangelism and more traditional conceptions of masculinity seem to map more closely to the values espoused by the Republican Party (Martinez and Martí, 2024; Geiger and Reny, 2024). Missing from these explanations is a theory of how differences in information environments shape political attitudes. Existing accounts largely emphasize who people are: their ideology, religion, or economic circumstances, rather than

the political information they encounter. I argue that transnational information environments constitute an overlooked source of political information that shapes political attitudes through differential exposure to, and belief in, political misinformation.

Transnational information environments shape political attitudes by altering the political information individuals encounter, conditioning whether that information is accepted as credible, and ultimately influencing political preferences. I conceptualize this process as consisting of three steps. First, cross-border social networks, which I call *transnational ties*, expand the universe of political content, including misinformation,¹ to which Latinos are exposed. These ties expose Latinos to political narratives transmitted by trusted social contacts with direct experience abroad, making those narratives more likely to receive initial credibility than information encountered from unfamiliar sources. Second, the exposure to information from transnational ties does not necessarily translate into belief unless a moderating factor is present. As emphasized in the misinformation literature, exposure and belief are conceptually and empirically distinct (Guess, Nagler and Tucker, 2019; Tucker et al., 2018; Freeze et al., 2021; Pennycook and Rand, 2021). What matters here are the conditions under which exposure becomes belief. Social media is a key condition because platforms repeatedly surface reinforcing content, provide signals of social endorsement, and facilitate interpersonal sharing across networks (Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015; Avram et al., 2020; Anspach and Carlson, 2020; Bail, 2021; Enders et al., 2023; Abrajano et al., 2025). As a result, more frequent social media use can increase repeated exposure and the perceived credibility of information encountered through transnational ties. Third, misinformation, which is sometimes encountered through these ties, can be politically consequential (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Tucker et al., 2018; Hopkins, Sides and Citrin, 2019; Pennycook and Rand,

¹Although the title refers to “rumors,” the paper uses the more precise analytical term misinformation throughout. The two concepts are related but distinct. Rumors are unverified claims whose truth value may be uncertain at the time they circulate, whereas misinformation refers to false or misleading information regardless of intent. Because the survey measures belief in demonstrably false political claims, misinformation is the appropriate term for the empirical analyses. The title uses “rumors” as a broader descriptor of the cross-border circulation of politically consequential claims through interpersonal networks, while the analyses focus specifically on misinformation.

2021; Berlinski et al., 2023). Given that political misinformation is often asymmetrically right-leaning (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Garrett and Bond, 2021; Freelon, Marwick and Kreiss, 2020), belief in misinformation may pull many Latinos toward Trump.

I test this argument using an original survey fielded by YouGov in September 2024 ($N = 1,500$), which includes a Latino oversample ($N = 750$) and a national sample ($N = 750$) matched to politically representative frames modeled on the US adult population.² The comparison sample allows assessing whether Latinos are more likely than white and Black Americans to possess the transnational ties central to the theory. The instrument measured transnational ties, social media use, and vote choice and evaluations of Trump, and separately captured exposure to and belief in six stories,³ four of which were misinformation narratives circulating within Latino networks, allowing me to test exposure and belief as distinct outcomes rather than conflating them. I estimate within-respondent models with story fixed effects and respondent-clustered standard errors, controlling for demographic characteristics throughout. Partisanship is added as a robustness check in the Appendix because missing responses would otherwise reduce the estimation sample.

The results provide support for several predictions of my theory. First, Latinos are more likely than non-Latinos⁴ to have transnational ties and to communicate more frequently with people living outside of the country. Second, transnational ties are associated with greater exposure to political misinformation. Third, the relationship between transnational ties and belief in misinformation is conditional on levels of social media use: in models that include the interaction, the coefficient on ties and social media use is positive and significant. At low levels of social media use, the association between transnational ties and belief is indistinguishable from zero. At average and high levels of social media use, stronger ties are

²The sampling frames are politically representative "modeled frames" of US adults (Hispanic only for the oversample), based upon the American Community Survey (ACS) public use microdata file, public voter file records, the 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration supplements, the 2020 National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, and the 2020 CES surveys, including demographics and 2020 presidential vote. Find more information about the sampling, weighting, and matching procedures in Appendix B.

³The specific stories are listed in the methods section and in Appendix 1.

⁴Throughout the paper, "non-Latinos" refers to white and Black respondents. Other racial and ethnic groups are excluded from the descriptive comparisons because of insufficient sample sizes.

associated with greater belief in misinformation. Finally, belief in misinformation is positively associated with warmer evaluations of and support for Trump in 2020 and 2024.

The paper contributes to the literature on political behavior in several ways. It introduces the concept of transnational information environments, arguing that political information environments vary systematically because of cross-border social networks. Additionally, it advances research on misinformation by distinguishing between exposure and belief and showing that interpersonal networks structure exposure while digital environments condition belief. Lastly, it employs the Latino case to develop a broader theory of how heterogeneous information environments shape political attitudes. Although Latinos are the empirical focus, the framework applies more generally to diasporic communities whose members navigate multiple national information environments. More broadly, the paper demonstrates that heterogeneous information environments constitute an important but overlooked source of variation in political attitudes and behavior.

Existing Explanations and the Missing Role of Information Environments

Some explanations for the puzzle of Latino support for Trump emphasize ideological sorting, economic voting, religion and evangelical identity, gendered cultural norms, and panethnic group appeals. These accounts generally argue that recent Latino support for Trump reflects underlying preferences and predispositions that increasingly align with Republican Party positions. However, they devote comparatively little attention to variation in the information environments through which political attitudes are formed.

The ideological-sorting account is best developed. Fraga, Velez and West (2025) show that recent Latino support for Trump reflects both compositional and attitudinal differences among Latino voters, and Carlos, Al-Faham and Jones-Correa (2025) find partisanship to be the strongest predictor of 2020 Latino Trump support, with Trump supporters remaining largely unmoved by information about his restrictive immigration attitudes. Using ANES

panel data, Anonymous (2026) find that Trump support has shifted alongside attitudes on issues the Republican Party increasingly emphasizes, such as transgender rights. These findings point to changing partisan alignment, but such changes could equally reflect responsiveness to a shifting information environment rather than fixed predispositions alone.

Economic explanations fare less well against the data’s own patterns. Garcia-Rios et al. (2025) and Carlos, Al-Faham and Jones-Correa (2025) link economic concerns and optimism about the country’s direction to Trump support. Other work shows that economic policy appeals can be electorally persuasive among Latino independents, particularly relative to immigration appeals (Wakefield, 2025). Yet Latino support for Trump increased substantially more than among white or Black voters, whose support stayed largely stable across the same economic conditions (Pew Research Center, 2025), and it continued rising from 2016 to 2020 despite Trump’s incumbency, when retrospective economic voting would predict the opposite. Moreover, neither economic voting nor the persuasive effects of economic appeals specify the informational process through which voters come to interpret economic conditions or assign political responsibility.

Religious and gendered explanations face a similar composition problem. Martinez and Martí (2024) find church attendance predicts 2020 Trump support, but only 17% of Latinos identified as Evangelical in 2024 and evangelical identification has held stable for a decade (Nadeem, 2023; Pew Research Center, 2014), making it a poor fit for explaining recent growth. Evidence on sexism is mixed: Geiger and Reny (2024) link status-hierarchy support to Trump support among non-white voters generally, while Hickel and Deckman (2022) and Carlos, Al-Faham and Jones-Correa (2025) find no such link specifically among Latinos.

A final line of work centers on group identity and linked fate, arguing that discrimination and anti-Latino rhetoric mobilize Latinos toward Democratic attachments (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Barreto, 2010; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Zepeda-Millán, 2017; Gutierrez et al., 2019; Sanchez, 2006; Sanchez and Vargas, 2016; Sanchez, Masuoka and Abrams, 2019). But recent work complicates any uniform panethnic

effect: Alamillo (2019) finds Trump support higher among Latinos who downplay racism, Hickel et al. (2020) show co-ethnic identity does not always dominate other commitments, Uribe (2025) documents status distinctions within the Latino population itself, and Hopkins, Kaiser and Pérez (2023) find partisan identities remarkably stable despite discrimination. Group appeals, in short, are often filtered through prior partisan attachments.

Across all four accounts, the common gap is the same: each identifies who is more likely to support Trump without explaining how individuals come to hold the beliefs and evaluations underlying that support. Transnational ties and social media fill that gap by shaping exposure to, and belief in, political misinformation.

Transnational Information Environments Shape Political Attitudes

Previous research shows that a person’s information environment influences their political life (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Iyengar, Peters and Kinder, 1982; McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Work in political communication has established that mass-media coverage influences which issues citizens consider important (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), how they evaluate political actors (Iyengar, Peters and Kinder, 1982), and what frames they use to evaluate their vote choice (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Subsequent work has expanded on this by exploring other components that matter to a person’s information environment. For Latinos, recent work shows that digital and linguistic information environments are especially important: many Latinos access politics through social media, and bilingual or Spanish-dominant users navigate media environments that differ from those of English-dominant Americans (Abrajano et al., 2025). For instance, interpersonal communication can shape the information someone hears, its source, and its perceived credibility (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Mutz, 2002). Beyond elite messaging, social processes influence the information people encounter, how it is discussed, and how it is validated (Zaller, 1992).

For many Americans, interpersonal networks are often composed of domestic ties, but Latinos have more diverse networks that include both domestic and transnational ties.


Americans can find themselves bound by the U.S. media ecosystem and social networks that focus mainly on U.S. politics and news. By contrast, Latinos in the U.S. often maintain ties to communities abroad. These relationships are sustained for a variety of reasons, including family obligations, emotional attachment, continued interest in the fate of the nation of origin, and a desire to maintain cultural identity and a sense of belonging across generations. While these ties may be especially salient for more recent immigrants, they can exist beyond the first generation. Today, those ties can persist as social media platforms have reduced the costs of maintaining these relationships and facilitated the formation and maintenance of communities organized around shared national, ethnic, and Latino identities (Abrajano et al., 2025). Evidence of these robust transnational ties has been documented, for example, through remittances, which remain common even to countries where emigration to the United States has declined over time (Orozco, 2023; World Bank, 2024). Latinos' information environments, then, include information flowing through both domestic and foreign networks, about political content relevant to both contexts. As such, transnational ties may provide an important channel for exposure to political information.

The theory proposes a three-step process linking transnational ties to support for Trump, illustrated in Figure 1. First, transnational ties expand exposure to political information, including misinformation, circulating across borders. Second, social media facilitates the maintenance of transnational ties and conditions whether that exposure translates into belief by increasing repetition, reinforcement, and social validation. Third, belief in misinformation is associated with greater support for Trump.

Step One: Transnational Ties Expand Exposure to Political Information

Migration scholarship has established that contemporary migrants do not assimilate into purely domestic information environments. Levitt (2001), in her foundational ethnography of “transnational villagers,” documented the durable cultural, social, and political exchanges between U.S. immigrant communities and their countries of origin. Portes, Guarnizo, and

Figure 1. Directed Acyclic Graph for the Theory of How Transnational Ties Relate to Trump Support



Note: The DAG summarizes the full proposed theoretical mechanism. Step 1: transnational ties increase exposure to political information, including misinformation, circulating across borders. Step 2: social media conditions whether exposure translates into belief by increasing repetition, reinforcement, and social validation. Step 3: belief in misinformation is associated with greater support for Trump.

Landolt (1999) provided the conceptual framework, defining transnational ties as regular, sustained, and institutionalized cross-border activities. Subsequent work has documented the consequences of these ties for civic engagement, partisan attitudes, and remittance flows, while also debating their scope and persistence (Eckstein and Najam, 2013; Waldinger, 2015; Orozco, 2023). Survey evidence consistently shows that Latinos report high rates of contact with people abroad (DeSipio, 2006; Pew Hispanic Center, 2007; Jones-Correa and McCann, 2016).

The implication of these cross-border exchanges for political communication remains underexplored. If transnational ties are real and significant, they may play an important role in Latinos' information environment and deserve further attention. I propose that these ties matter because they transmit more than casual apolitical information. Instead, these ties convey political narratives and attitudes, often framed by the lived experience of those living abroad. For instance, someone's relative in Caracas describing the collapse of public services under the Maduro government carries a different kind of authority than an English-language news report, particularly when the relative's account is repeated, embellished, or extended

through social media. A friend in Tijuana who describes the violence of the cartels carries a similar authority for U.S. immigration debates. These accounts are produced by trusted contacts whose physical presence is itself the central credibility cue.

Transnational ties function as conduits of exposure. Some of the content traveling through these ties is accurate, some is not. The key is that these ties expose individuals to narratives originating outside the United States that are less prominent in domestic U.S. media. Conversations with relatives or friends abroad may include firsthand accounts of issues such as economic collapse, authoritarian governments, migration, organized crime, or political instability. They provide a context through which later political claims are interpreted.

Many prominent right-leaning misinformation narratives in the United States invoke precisely these themes: socialism, immigration, crime, election integrity. Because transnational ties increase familiarity with these issues through personal relationships, they may make politically lopsided misinformation that coincides with those experiences more salient or more likely to be encountered. I therefore expect respondents with stronger transnational ties to report greater exposure to political misinformation, even after controlling for partisanship and demographic characteristics. Given this, I propose that:

H1 Exposure: *Transnational ties are positively associated with exposure to political misinformation.*

Exposure vs. Belief: Two Distinct Processes

Exposure does not necessarily translate into belief. Research on misinformation consistently shows that exposure and belief are conceptually and empirically distinct processes (Tucker et al., 2018; Guess, Nagler and Tucker, 2019). Many people encounter false information online, but comparatively few accept it as true. For example, Guess et al. (2019) show that misinformation belief is substantially less common than exposure, while Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) find that even widespread exposure produces relatively modest downstream effects on

vote choice. Tucker et al. (2018) similarly argue that identical messages can produce different effects across individuals through different channels of influence. Among Latinos, Abrajano et al. (2025) further show that reliance on Spanish-language social media for political news is associated with greater belief in false electoral narratives. Collectively, this literature demonstrates that exposure alone is insufficient for belief.

Research also identifies several factors that increase the likelihood that exposure results in acceptance. People evaluate messages using cues beyond factual accuracy, including repetition, source credibility, social endorsement, emotional salience, novelty, and consistency with prior beliefs (Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953; Berlyne, 1960; Zajonc, 1968; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Cialdini, 2009; Lodge and Taber, 2013). Repeated exposure alone can increase the perceived accuracy of false claims through familiarity (Fazio et al., 2015; Pennycook, Cannon and Rand, 2018), while social endorsement, such as likes and shares, can further reinforce credibility (Messing and Westwood, 2014). Messages are also more persuasive when they come from trusted or knowledgeable sources (Pornpitakpan, 2004; Messing and Westwood, 2014; Jia et al., 2025), evoke emotion or novelty (Brady et al., 2017; Vosoughi, Roy and Aral, 2018; Martel, Pennycook and Rand, 2020), or align with individuals' prior beliefs through motivated reasoning (Kahan et al., 2017; Strickland, Taber and Lodge, 2011; Flynn, Nyhan and Reifler, 2017).

These mechanisms are especially relevant for transnational information environments. Information transmitted by relatives or friends abroad may be viewed as particularly credible because it comes from trusted individuals with firsthand experience of the political contexts being discussed. At the same time, social media can repeatedly expose users to the same claims while surrounding them with social endorsement and emotionally engaging content. These processes can help explain why some individuals who encounter misinformation come to accept it as credible.

Step Two: Social Media Conditions When Exposure Becomes Belief

Social media platforms operationalize many of the factors identified in the misinformation literature. For instance, platform algorithms repeatedly recommend content similar to what users have previously engaged with, thus providing the repetition needed for false claims to appear truer. These can create repeated doses of content across days and weeks (Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015; Bail, 2021). Further, social media platforms provide an important proxy for social endorsement through features such as likes, shares, and comments (Avram et al., 2020). It may be the case that seeing a false claim’s popularity online signals credibility or social validation. Encrypted and semi-private messaging platforms compound these dynamics as forwarding obscures a message’s origin, and interpersonal sharing increases exposure and trust (Resende et al., 2019; Valenzuela et al., 2019). Lastly, social media plays a key role in the belief of misinformation because it helps to easily spread information that’s more emotionally charged. We know from the literature that misinformation is often more emotionally arousing than accurate news, which aids in its “shareability” (Vosoughi, Roy and Aral, 2018; Brady et al., 2017).

For people with transnational ties, social media use matters in specific ways. This expectation builds on evidence that Latinos use social media for political information, and that Spanish-language social media use is associated with belief in political misinformation (Abrajano et al., 2025). Heavy social media use multiplies encounters with content originating in transnational networks; embeds those encounters in feeds that repeat similar content; and surrounds them with social-endorsement signals from co-ethnic peers. A claim about Venezuelan socialism that begins as a single message from a relative becomes, in the heavy social-media user’s feed, a recurring piece of content with apparent broad support. For users with low social media use, the same transnational tie produces a single, isolated encounter that is harder to mistake for consensus.

This logic implies that the effect of transnational ties on belief is conditional on social media use. At high levels of use, the digital environment can condition the transnational

tie information into a repeated, validated stream of misinformation that results in belief. This conditional logic is an important theoretical claim of the paper and distinguishes the present argument from prior work that has treated transnational ties and digital media as independent influences. Given this, I propose the following:

***H2 Belief:** The association between transnational ties and belief in political misinformation is more positive among respondents who use social media more frequently.*

Step Three: Belief in Misinformation Is Associated with Greater Support for Trump

The third step in my theory concerns the political consequences of believing misinformation. We know from prior research that when people believe misinformation, factors such as candidate evaluation, vote choice, policy preferences, and trust in institutions can be affected (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Tucker et al., 2018; Hopkins, Sides and Citrin, 2019; Berlinski et al., 2023; Pennycook and Rand, 2021). For instance, some scholars have argued and shown that the 2016 presidential election outcome was influenced in favor of Trump by a Russian-led disinformation effort (Jamieson, 2018). These findings have been affirmed by others who show that misinformation exposure was associated at least some reduction in support for Clinton in 2016 compared to Obama voters in 2012 (Gunther, Beck and Nisbet, 2019). Further, there may be an asymmetry in misinformation, with pro-Trump false stories more prevalent than pro-Clinton ones (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). Notably, what may appear as modest, belief-induced shifts in support for candidates or policies can have larger consequences for the electoral system when these effects are aggregated across constituencies (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). Because the supply of misinformation tilts right (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Freelon, Marwick and Kreiss, 2020; Garrett and Bond, 2021), belief in misinformation should pull believers to the right as well. For a respondent who has come to believe that the Democratic Party is pushing socialism, that immigrants are responsible for rising crime, or

that the 2020 election was stolen, support for Trump is the politically congruent response. Given this, I propose my last hypothesis:

H3 Trump Support: *Belief in political misinformation is positively associated with support for Donald Trump.*

Testing the Theory: Latinos as a Strategic Case

While the underlying logic of my theory can apply to other groups, Latinos are a particularly good test case. My theory emphasizes that transnational ties are associated with exposure, that social media use conditions belief, and that Trump support is correlated with belief. Since Latinos are more likely to have ties *and* to use social media to sustain those ties, they present an ideal case for testing my theory. Existing evidence also shows that Latinos are highly politically engaged on social media and that language structures the political information they encounter online (Abrajano et al., 2025). If the proposed mechanism is correct, the case of Latinos should show the correlations I propose. I discuss the generalizability of this case in the discussion section.

The following examples illustrate my theory in more concrete terms. Consider, for instance, two ideal respondents. The first is Ana, who maintains contact with relatives in Venezuela, uses social media daily, and hears from them about state failure under the Maduro regime. Her relatives share with her that socialism and president Maduro are to blame for the current political situation they are experiencing. Ana later goes online and sees a claim on Facebook that the Democratic Party is pushing for socialism in the U.S. Ana does not encounter such a claim out of the blue. Instead, she hears this claim alongside her relatives' stories, which lends it more credence. It seems plausible because it is consistent with what was expressed by her family and friends back home. The second example is Carlos, who does not communicate with people abroad but does use social media. Carlos sees the same claim about the Democratic Party pushing socialism in the U.S. In contrast to Ana, exposure to

the claim is unaccompanied by any transnational anchors. This leaves Carlos with fewer cues encouraging him to view the claim as credible. My theory would predict, then, that Ana, but not Carlos, will come to accept the claim, and that will begin pushing her toward Trump. The empirical task is to show that this conditional logic holds for the population from which Ana and Carlos are drawn.

Research Design

Survey Design

I test the proposed theory using an original bilingual (English and Spanish) survey fielded by YouGov in September 2024. The final dataset contains 1,500 respondents and consists of a nationally matched sample of 750 U.S. adults and a Latino oversample of 750 respondents. Each sample was matched and weighted separately to its target population. Additional details on the sampling procedure and weighting are provided in Appendix B, and the complete survey instrument is reported in Appendix C.

The nationally matched sample is used descriptively to compare the prevalence of transnational ties across racial and ethnic groups. Because the theory developed in this paper explains variation within the Latino population, all hypothesis tests are estimated using the weighted Latino oversample. The broader survey project was reviewed by the authors' Institutional Review Board and determined to be exempt from human subjects review. It was preregistered on the Open Science Framework during data collection and before the analyses reported here were conducted.⁵

⁵The preregistration, titled "Latino Political Pulse: The Consequences of Unique Information Environments and Misinformation," was registered on September 1, 2024. The present manuscript analyzes the preregistered observational component of the survey; the embedded experiment is not examined because it addresses a separate research question. The preregistration is available at osf.rumors.

Measuring Exposure and Belief Using Misinformation Stories

Exposure and belief are measured using four misinformation narratives that circulated within Latino digital networks before the 2024 presidential election. The narratives were selected from Factchequeado.com,⁶ which tracks and verifies Spanish-language misinformation shared online. Two additional stories were included as robustness checks: one factual story drawn from contemporary news coverage and one false story created by the author that had not circulated online. The stories are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Specific Stories Shown to Respondents

Story	Veracity
Chinese loans and investments are better for Latin American countries than United States loans and investments	False
Biden and Congress are working on banning the Bible	False
Vice President Harris congratulated President Maduro for winning the 2024 presidential election in Venezuela	False
Venezuelan refugees are causing a rise in crime rates in Latin America	False
Some states now allow teachers to be armed in the classroom	True
Phil McClaren secretly owns all social media platforms	Fabricated by author

Note: The first four stories are misinformation narratives. The fifth story is true. The final story is a placebo item fabricated by the author and was not known to have circulated online prior to the survey.

Respondents were shown each story and asked whether they had previously heard it. Those reporting prior exposure were then asked to evaluate the story’s truthfulness on a five-point scale ranging from “definitely false” to “definitely true.” All respondents were debriefed at the conclusion of the survey and informed which stories were true and which were false.

Key Independent Variables

In addition to demographic and political characteristics, the survey measured respondents’ transnational ties and social media use. Transnational ties were measured using two questions.

⁶Factchequeado is a Spanish-language fact-checking organization that monitors and verifies misinformation circulating online.

Respondents were first asked, “*Thinking about the people you know, do any of them live outside the U.S.?*” Those answering affirmatively were then asked how frequently they communicated with friends or family living outside the United States, with response options ranging from “I do not talk to friends or family who live in other countries” to “More than once a week.”

The survey also measured social media use across multiple platforms. Respondents indicated which platforms they used and then reported whether they used each selected platform daily, weekly, monthly, less than once a month, or not at all.

Political Outcomes

The survey measured respondents’ prospective 2024 presidential vote choice, recalled 2020 presidential vote, and overall evaluations of Donald Trump.⁷ Respondents reporting a prospective 2024 vote choice were also asked how confident they were in that choice. Respondents who reported not voting in 2020 were asked whom they would have supported had they voted. Candidate evaluations were measured on a five-point scale ranging from “extremely bad” to “extremely good,” with an additional “no opinion” option. Candidate order was randomized to minimize response-order effects.

Measures and Empirical Strategy

All continuous variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to facilitate comparison of coefficients across models. Transnational ties are measured using an index that combines the presence of cross-border ties with the frequency of communication with individuals living outside the United States. Respondents reporting no ties receive a value of zero, while higher values indicate more frequent contact among those with transnational ties. Social media use is measured as an index averaging self-reported frequency of use across multiple platforms.⁸

Exposure is measured using binary indicators of whether respondents reported having

⁷The survey also measured evaluations of Joe Biden, Kamala Harris, and JD Vance. Those outcomes fall outside the scope of the current paper.

⁸Appendix C lists the social media platforms included in the survey.

heard each of the four misinformation stories. Belief is measured as an index averaging respondents’ perceived truthfulness of those stories. Respondents who reported not hearing a story were coded as zero. Consequently, the index measures population-level belief in circulating misinformation rather than respondents’ hypothetical propensity to believe misinformation if exposed. Respondents who reported hearing a story were coded according to their reported assessment of its truthfulness. Additional discussion of this coding decision is provided in Appendix E.3.

The primary analyses use the weighted Latino oversample and control for generation, gender, education, and age. Appendix G examines the sensitivity of the results to specifications that additionally control for political interest, income, partisanship, religion, and national origin, while Appendix H reports parallel analyses using the full unweighted Latino sample.

For H1, I estimate respondent–story linear probability models relating misinformation exposure to transnational ties. The primary specification pools respondent–story observations and includes story fixed effects; Appendix G.2 reports story-specific models. H2 and H3 are estimated at the respondent level. For H2, I estimate linear regression models of misinformation belief on transnational ties, social media use, and their interaction. For H3, I estimate linear regression models relating misinformation belief to Trump favorability, reported 2020 Trump vote, and intended 2024 Trump support.


Finally, I estimate conditional indirect associations linking transnational ties to Trump support through misinformation belief. Rather than estimating a single average indirect association, this approach allows the magnitude of the indirect relationship to vary across levels of social media use. Because the data are observational, these estimates are interpreted as descriptive associations rather than causal mediation effects.

Results

I first present descriptive comparisons showing that Latinos are more likely than non-Latinos⁹ to report transnational ties and more frequent communication with contacts abroad. These comparisons motivate the focus on Latinos as a case for evaluating the proposed theory. I then present the results for each stage of the proposed mechanism: misinformation exposure (H1), misinformation belief (H2), Donald Trump support (H3), and finally the conditional indirect associations that link these relationships.

Latinos Are More Embedded in Transnational Information Environments

The descriptive comparisons examine three features of transnational information environments: the prevalence of transnational ties, the frequency of cross-border communication, and social media use.



⁹Throughout the paper, “non-Latinos” refers to white and Black respondents. Other racial and ethnic groups are excluded from the descriptive comparisons because of insufficient sample sizes.

Figure 2 presents the first implication of the theory: if Latinos are more embedded in transnational information environments, they should be more likely to maintain cross-border social ties. As expected, Latinos are substantially more likely than non-Latinos to report knowing someone who lives outside the United States. Approximately 55% of Latinos report at least one transnational tie, compared to roughly 43% of non-Latinos. The confidence intervals do not overlap, indicating that this difference is statistically significant. These findings suggest that Latinos are more likely to be embedded in transnational social networks.

Figure 3




Figure 3 examines communication frequency among respondents who report at least one transnational tie. Although the distributions overlap considerably, Latinos are more concentrated at the highest levels of contact frequency, indicating that they are somewhat more likely than non-Latinos to maintain frequent communication with people living abroad. Thus, the descriptive evidence suggests that Latinos differ from the comparison groups in two respects: they are more likely to have transnational ties, and, conditional on having those ties, they communicate with them somewhat more frequently. These patterns are consistent

with the argument that Latinos are more deeply embedded in transnational information environments, making them an especially appropriate population in which to evaluate the proposed theoretical mechanism.

The theory further proposes that social media helps sustain many of these cross-border relationships. Although the descriptive evidence cannot establish this relationship directly, Latinos also report significantly greater social media use than non-Latino respondents.

Figure 4





Figure 4 shows that Latino respondents report higher levels of social media use than non-Latino respondents. Latinos average approximately .46 on the social media index, compared to .38 among non-Latinos, where 0 indicates never using any of the measured platforms and 1 indicates daily use of all platforms included in the index. The confidence intervals do not overlap, indicating that this difference is statistically significant. Although descriptive, this pattern is consistent with the argument that Latinos are more deeply embedded in social media environments that facilitate the exchange of political information across borders. It also aligns with recent evidence that Latinos rely heavily on social media

for political information and that Latino political engagement online is comparable to, and in some contexts exceeds, that of non-Hispanic whites (Abrajano et al., 2025).


Transnational Ties Are Widespread Across the Latino Population

The previous figures showed that Latinos are more likely than non-Latinos to report transnational ties and higher levels of social media use. The following figures examine whether respondents with transnational ties differ systematically from those without such ties within each population. This comparison helps assess whether transnational ties simply proxy for other demographic characteristics or instead represent a distinct feature of respondents' information environments.

Figure 5 compares Latinos with and without transnational ties. The distributions of age, education, income, and partisanship are remarkably similar across the two groups. Respondents with transnational ties are not systematically younger, wealthier, more educated, or more partisan than those without such ties. Instead, transnational ties appear broadly distributed throughout the Latino population rather than concentrated within a particular demographic or political subgroup. This pattern suggests that, among Latinos, transnational ties capture a meaningful feature of individuals' information environments rather than simply reflecting observable socioeconomic characteristics.

Figure 5

By contrast, Figure 6 shows a different pattern for non-Latino respondents. Among whites and Black Americans, respondents with transnational ties tend to be younger, more highly educated, and have higher incomes than those without such ties, while differences in partisanship remain comparatively small. In other words, transnational ties appear considerably more selective among non-Latinos than among Latinos.

Figure 6

Because transnational ties are not concentrated among a narrow demographic subgroup of Latinos, they are less likely to serve merely as a proxy for socioeconomic status or other observable characteristics within the Latino sample. This pattern strengthens the case for evaluating the proposed mechanism. I now turn to the hypothesis tests.

Hypothesis 1: Transnational Ties Are Associated with Greater Exposure to Misinformation

Hypothesis 1 proposes that “*transnational ties are positively associated with exposure to political misinformation.*” Table 2 reports estimates from pooled respondent–story linear probability models relating transnational ties to self-reported misinformation exposure.

The results are consistent with Hypothesis 1. Transnational ties are positively and significantly associated with exposure to misinformation. A one-unit increase in the transnational ties index is associated with a 0.127 increase in the probability of reporting having encountered one of the misinformation stories included in the survey ($p < .001$). Substantively, moving from having no transnational ties to the highest observed level of cross-border contact

Table 2. Hypothesis 1: Transnational Ties and Exposure to Misinformation

	Model 1	
	Coefficient	SE
Transnational ties	0.127***	(0.031)
Generation	0.041	(0.033)
Gender	0.066***	(0.021)
Education	0.019	(0.040)
Age	−0.163***	(0.043)
Story fixed effects	Yes	
Observations	3,000	
R^2	0.090	
Within R^2	0.034	

Note: Entries are coefficients from a linear probability model estimated using the Latino sample only. The dependent variable is whether respondents reported having heard each misinformation story. The data are organized in respondent–story format, with each respondent contributing one observation for each misinformation story. Story fixed effects account for differences in baseline exposure across misinformation stories. All models control for generation, gender, education, and age. Standard errors are clustered by respondent and reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

is associated with approximately a 13 percentage-point increase in the probability of reporting exposure.

Among the control variables, younger respondents and women are significantly more likely to report exposure, whereas generation and education are not significantly associated with misinformation exposure. The estimated association between transnational ties and exposure remains positive and statistically significant after accounting for these demographic characteristics.

Appendix Table G.1 adds controls for political interest, income, partisanship, national origin, and religious affiliation, characteristics that could plausibly influence both the maintenance of transnational ties and exposure to political misinformation. The estimated association between transnational ties and misinformation exposure remains substantively unchanged, indicating that the findings are not explained by these alternative factors.

These findings suggest that transnational ties constitute an important pathway through

which political information and misinformation travel across national borders. Among Latinos, individuals with stronger transnational ties are consistently more likely to report exposure to misinformation, providing evidence consistent with the first step of the proposed theoretical mechanism.

Hypothesis 2: Social Media Conditions the Relationship Between Transnational Ties and Belief

Hypothesis 2 proposes that *“the association between transnational ties and belief in political misinformation is more positive among respondents who use social media more frequently.”*

Table 3 evaluates this expectation using a linear regression model relating misinformation belief to transnational ties, social media use, and their interaction.

Table 3. Hypothesis 2: Social Media Conditions Misinformation Belief

	Model 1	
	Coefficient	SE
Transnational ties	−0.025	(0.050)
Social media use	0.165***	(0.047)
Transnational ties × Social media use	0.202**	(0.098)
Generation	0.031	(0.021)
Gender	0.040***	(0.014)
Education	−0.025	(0.026)
Age	−0.025	(0.035)
Constant	0.048*	(0.029)
Observations	750	
R^2	0.101	

Note: Entries are coefficients from a weighted linear regression estimated using the Latino sample only. The dependent variable is an index of belief in misinformation ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater belief in misinformation. The interaction between transnational ties and social media use captures whether the association between transnational ties and belief in misinformation varies across levels of social media use. All models control for generation, gender, education, and age. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 2. The estimated interaction coefficient

of transnational ties and social media use is positive (0.202) and statistically significant ($p < .05$), indicating that the association between transnational ties and misinformation belief becomes more positive as social media use increases. Respondents with stronger transnational ties are therefore more likely to believe misinformation when they are also more frequent users of social media.

The constituent terms help clarify this relationship. Social media use is positively associated with misinformation belief ($\beta = 0.165$, $p < .01$), whereas the main effect of transnational ties is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Because the coefficient on transnational ties represents its association with belief among respondents reporting no social media use, these results suggest that transnational ties alone are not associated with greater misinformation belief. Rather, the positive interaction indicates that transnational ties become increasingly associated with belief as social media use increases, consistent with the proposed theoretical mechanism.

The findings are robust across alternative samples and specifications. Appendix H shows that the interaction remains positive and statistically significant when the model is estimated using the full unweighted Latino sample ($N = 865$). Appendix G adds controls for political interest, income, partisanship, religious affiliation, and national origin. Under this more demanding specification, the interaction remains positive but is no longer statistically significant. The robustness checks suggest that the proposed relationship is reasonably stable across samples but somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of additional covariates. Accordingly, the evidence for Hypothesis 2 should be interpreted as suggestive rather than conclusive.

Hypothesis 3: Misinformation Belief Is Associated with Greater Support for Donald Trump

Hypothesis 3 proposes that “*belief in political misinformation is positively associated with support for Donald Trump.*” Table 4 reports the estimated association between misinformation belief and three measures of Trump support: Trump favorability, reported 2020 Trump vote,

and intended 2024 Trump support.

Table 4. Hypothesis 3: Belief in Misinformation and Support for Donald Trump

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Favorability		2020 Vote		2024 Support	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Misinformation Belief	0.544***	(0.074)	0.555***	(0.078)	0.359***	(0.089)
Generation	-0.114***	(0.044)	-0.007	(0.046)	-0.027	(0.053)
Gender	0.010	(0.029)	0.033	(0.031)	0.058	(0.035)
Education	-0.048	(0.052)	0.062	(0.055)	0.032	(0.063)
Age	-0.023	(0.067)	0.262***	(0.071)	0.152*	(0.081)
Constant	0.377***	(0.042)	0.041	(0.045)	0.223***	(0.051)
Observations	750		750		750	
R^2	0.080		0.086		0.039	

Note: Entries are coefficients from weighted linear regression models estimated using the Latino oversample only. Model 1 estimates Trump favorability on a 0–1 scale, with higher values indicating warmer evaluations of Donald Trump. Model 2 estimates reported 2020 Trump vote, and Model 3 estimates intended 2024 Trump support. The primary independent variable is belief in misinformation. All models control for generation, gender, education, and age. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The findings strongly support Hypothesis 3. Misinformation belief is positively and statistically significantly associated with all three measures of support for Donald Trump. A one-unit increase in the belief index is associated with a 0.544 increase in Trump favorability ($p < .001$), a 0.555 increase in the probability of reporting a 2020 vote for Trump ($p < .001$), and a 0.359 increase in intended 2024 Trump support ($p < .001$). These are among the largest substantive associations estimated in the paper.

The consistency of these findings across all three outcomes suggests that misinformation belief is associated not only with warmer evaluations of Trump but also with both retrospective and prospective electoral support. Although these models cannot establish causality, they are consistent with the proposed theoretical argument that accepting misinformation as credible is associated with greater support for Trump.

Among the demographic controls, few variables exhibit consistent associations across outcomes. Later-generation Latinos report significantly lower Trump favorability, while older

respondents are more likely to report both a 2020 Trump vote and intended 2024 support. Gender and education are not consistently associated with the three outcomes.

The Appendix reports additional robustness checks. First, Appendix G introduces controls for political interest, income, partisanship, religious affiliation, and national origin. Under these more demanding specifications, the association between misinformation belief and both Trump favorability and reported 2020 Trump vote remains positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient for intended 2024 Trump support remains positive but is no longer statistically distinguishable from zero. Appendix G.5 further shows that much of this attenuation occurs after adding partisanship, with the remaining reduction occurring in the full specification, which is estimated on a smaller sample because of missing data on the additional covariates. Second, Appendix H re-estimates the models using the full unweighted Latino sample ($N = 865$). The estimated associations remain positive and statistically significant for all three outcomes and are substantively larger than those reported in the primary analyses. Thus, these analyses indicate that the association with intended 2024 Trump support is more sensitive to additional controls and sample composition while the relationship between misinformation belief and Trump favorability and recalled 2020 Trump vote is robust across alternative specifications.

Bringing the Steps Together: Evidence for the Full Information-Environment Mechanism

The results are consistent with the proposed theoretical sequence. Transnational ties are associated with greater exposure to misinformation, the association between transnational ties and misinformation belief becomes stronger as social media use increases, and misinformation belief is positively associated with support for Trump. The remaining question is whether these relationships, when considered jointly, are consistent with the broader mechanism proposed by the theory. To assess this question, I estimate a conditional indirect association model.

The first stage estimates misinformation belief as a function of transnational ties, social media use, and their interaction, while the second stage estimates Trump support as a function of misinformation belief. The conditional indirect association is then calculated at low, average, and high levels of social media use using the estimated coefficients from these models. Confidence intervals are obtained via simulation based on the estimated variance-covariance matrix. Full model equations are provided in Appendix F. Because the data are observational, these estimates should be interpreted as descriptive rather than causal.

Figure 7




Figure 7 presents the estimated conditional indirect association between transnational ties and Trump support through misinformation belief at low, average, and high levels of social media use. The corresponding estimates are reported in Appendix F.2. At low levels of social media use, the estimated indirect association is small and not statistically distinguishable from zero. At average levels of social media use, it becomes positive and statistically significant, and it is largest among respondents with high levels of social media use.

This pattern mirrors the theoretical argument developed in the paper. Transnational ties are associated with greater exposure to political information circulating across national borders, but whether that information becomes politically consequential depends on the surrounding information environment. The results suggest that the association between transnational ties and Trump support operates primarily among respondents who are more deeply embedded in social media environments, where misinformation is more likely to be encountered, reinforced, and accepted as credible.

These estimates should not be interpreted as causal mediation effects. Rather, they summarize the observed relationships across the three empirical stages of the theory and show that, when considered jointly, they are consistent with the proposed information-environment mechanism.

Discussion: Implications of Transnational Information Environments For the Study of Political Behavior

Broadly, this paper suggests that political attitudes are shaped not only by individual characteristics and domestic media but also by the transnational social networks through which political information travels. For Latinos, transnational ties create cross-border information environments that structure exposure to political claims, including misinformation, and the evidence is broadly consistent with social media conditioning whether exposure is amplified into belief. By distinguishing exposure from belief, the paper shows that political behavior depends not simply on whether individuals encounter political information but on whether they accept it as credible: belief in these narratives is associated with warmer evaluations of Trump, reported 2020 Trump vote, and intended 2024 Trump support. The relationships with Trump favorability and reported 2020 Trump vote remain robust across alternative specifications, whereas the relationship with intended 2024 Trump support is more sensitive to additional controls.

This account does not replace existing explanations of Latino political behavior centered on ideology, economics, religion, or gendered norms; it adds a dimension those accounts tend to understate. Technological change has made cross-border contact cheaper to sustain, and social media has expanded the reach of political content moving through those ties. Latinos are a particularly useful case because many remain connected to information environments outside the U.S. while participating fully in U.S. political life, a pattern consistent with recent evidence that Latino online political activity is central, not peripheral, to how Latinos encounter political information (Abrajano et al., 2025). More broadly, the study illustrates that transnational information environments are unevenly distributed across social groups, and that this heterogeneity is consequential for political attitudes, candidate evaluations, and electoral behavior, a logic that likely extends beyond Latinos to other diasporic communities, such as Asian American communities, who maintain transnational ties and heavy social media use.

For the Study of Political Communication

This paper treats exposure, belief, and downstream political consequences as sequential rather than separate processes. The evidence is strongest for the first and third stages of this sequence: transnational ties are consistently associated with misinformation exposure, and misinformation belief is consistently associated with support for Trump. Evidence for the moderating role of social media is more sensitive to specification, but the overall pattern remains consistent with the theoretical expectation that information environments shape whether exposure becomes belief. The paper also extends prior work, which has centered on individual-level traits (knowledge, motivated reasoning, partisan identity) or message-level features (repetition, emotionality, source), by identifying transnational ties as a network-level mechanism that helps explain why some information environments become politically consequential.

Alternative Explanations and Limitations

Several alternative explanations merit consideration. One possibility is partisan self-selection: respondents already predisposed toward Trump may be more likely to maintain transnational ties, consume social media, and believe misinformation (Jenke, 2024). While the cross-sectional design cannot fully eliminate this possibility, the evidence is not fully consistent with it. The association between transnational ties and misinformation exposure remains robust across alternative specifications, and the relationship between misinformation belief and Trump support persists after accounting for standard demographic controls. These patterns are also reproduced in analyses using the full unweighted Latino sample.

National origin and religiosity provide a second potential explanation. Respondents from some national-origin groups may combine stronger transnational ties with distinct political experiences, while more religious Latinos may differ systematically in both network structure and political attitudes. Adding controls for national origin and born-again Christian identification leaves the exposure and Trump-support stages substantively unchanged but attenuates the interaction between transnational ties and social media predicting misinformation belief. Because these models are estimated on a smaller sample due to missing data on the additional covariates, this attenuation should be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, it suggests that the evidence for the belief stage of the proposed mechanism is more sensitive to specification than the exposure and political-consequence stages.

The principal limitation of the paper is its reliance on cross-sectional observational data. Although the theory proposes a temporal sequence linking transnational ties to exposure, belief, and ultimately political attitudes, the analyses identify conditional associations rather than causal effects. Unobserved characteristics, such as migration histories or differences in the political information environments of respondents' countries of origin, may also contribute to the observed relationships. Accordingly, the evidence is strongest for the first and third stages of the proposed mechanism: transnational ties are consistently associated with greater misinformation exposure, and misinformation belief is consistently associated

with greater support for Trump. The evidence that social media conditions the relationship between transnational ties and belief is supportive but more sensitive to model specification, highlighting the need for future research using panel data, behavioral measures of information exposure, and experimental designs.

Conclusion: Political Information Travels Across Borders

Why has Latino support for Trump grown despite his anti-immigrant agenda and rhetoric? Part of the answer lies in the information environments in which political attitudes form. Many Latinos are embedded in transnational information environments sustained by cross-border social ties, and social media helps amplify the political content that circulates through them.

The paper makes three contributions. First, it introduces the concept of transnational information environments, showing that political information environments vary systematically because of cross-border social networks. Second, it advances research on misinformation by distinguishing exposure from belief and demonstrating that these are empirically distinct stages. Transnational ties are consistently associated with exposure, whereas belief is consistently associated with downstream political attitudes and appears to depend in part on social media environments. Third, it demonstrates the broader relevance of the Latino case for theories of political behavior. While Latinos are the empirical focus, the framework applies more generally to diasporic communities whose members navigate multiple national information environments.

Political information does not stop at national borders, and neither do the social networks that carry it. Understanding contemporary political behavior therefore requires accounting for how transnational information environments shape what people encounter, what they believe, and ultimately how they make political decisions.

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A. Data and Replication Availability Statement

The survey was preregistered on the Open Science Framework (OSF) during data collection. The preregistration, survey instrument, codebook, and project documentation are publicly available through the project’s OSF repository.¹⁰

Upon publication, the repository will be updated to include the replication materials necessary to reproduce all analyses, tables, and figures reported in this manuscript. These materials will include the replication code, analysis scripts, and, subject to institutional review board approval and applicable data-use restrictions, anonymized respondent-level survey data.

B. Survey Design and Sample

B.1. Sample and Weighting

The survey was fielded by YouGov between August 29 and September 11, 2024. A total of 1,600 respondents were interviewed, consisting of a nationally matched sample of 795 U.S. adults and an oversample of 805 Hispanic respondents. Each sample was independently matched to a target sampling frame and subsequently matched down to 750 respondents, yielding a final dataset of 1,500 respondents.

The nationally matched sample was constructed to be representative of the U.S. adult population, while the oversample was designed to increase the number of Latino respondents available for subgroup analyses. The sampling frames were derived from the American Community Survey (ACS), public voter files, the 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration Supplement, the 2020 National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, and the 2020 Cooperative Election Study (CES).

YouGov constructed survey weights using a multistage procedure. Respondents were first matched to their respective sampling frames using propensity scores estimated from

¹⁰osf.rumors

demographic and geographic characteristics. Propensity scores were then grouped into deciles and post-stratified to improve correspondence between the matched samples and their target populations. The nationally matched sample was additionally post-stratified to the distribution of 2020 presidential vote choice and the joint distribution of gender, age, race, and education. The Latino oversample was post-stratified to the distribution of 2020 presidential vote choice and the joint distribution of gender, age, and education. Finally, the weighted nationally matched sample and Latino oversample were combined and post-stratified by race to produce the final combined survey weight (`weight_combined`).

The nationally matched sample is used only for descriptive comparisons of the prevalence of transnational ties across racial and ethnic groups. Because the theoretical argument developed in this paper concerns variation within the Latino population, all hypothesis tests are estimated using the Latino oversample and the corresponding oversample survey weight (`weight_os`), which adjusts the oversample to be representative of the U.S. Latino adult population. The combined survey weight (`weight_combined`) is used only for analyses based on the full sample. No survey weight exists for the combined Latino subgroup analyzed as a robustness check in Appendix H; see that section for details.

B.2. Full Sample Composition

Table 5. Full Sample Composition

Sample	Interviewed N	Final Matched N
General sample	795	750
Hispanic Oversample	805	750
Total	1,600	1,500

B.3. Weighted vs. Unweighted Sample Characteristics of Full Sample

Table 6. Weighted and Unweighted Characteristics of the Full Sample

Characteristic	Unweighted	Weighted
Latino	0.577	0.156
Female	0.532	0.515
Age	45.037	47.676
Education	3.252	3.467
Income	6.396	6.730
Partisanship	3.626	3.845
Political interest	0.666	0.690

B.4. Country of Origin Distribution Among Latinos

Table 7. Country of Origin Distribution Among Latinos

Country/Territory	Unweighted N	Weighted Percent
Mexico	333	37.8
United States	178	20.4
Puerto Rico	108	11.4
Spain	73	7.8
Cuba	49	5.2
Colombia	18	2.1
Other	18	2.2
Dominican Republic	16	1.4
El Salvador	16	1.9
Ecuador	13	1.4
Guatemala	13	1.5
Costa Rica	9	1.2
Honduras	9	1.0
Venezuela	9	0.9
Brazil	8	0.9
Argentina	6	0.9
Chile	6	0.8
Nicaragua	6	0.9
Peru	6	0.7
Panama	3	0.2
Uruguay	2	0.2

Note: Respondents could select more than one country or territory of family origin. Percentages therefore may sum to more than 100.

C. Survey Instrument and Measurement

C.1. Variable Construction and Coding

Table 8. Variable Construction and Coding

Variable	Construction	Original Range	Final Range
Transnational Ties	Composite measure combining the presence of ties outside the United States and frequency of contact with those ties. Respondents reporting no ties were coded 0. Higher values indicate more frequent communication with people living abroad.	0–5	0–1
Social Media Use	Average frequency of use across all reported social media platforms. Platform-specific responses were coded from 0 (non-user) to 1 (daily use) and averaged.	0–5	0–1
Misinformation Exposure	Binary indicator coded 1 if the respondent reported having heard a story and 0 otherwise. Exposure was analyzed both at the story level and as an average index across misinformation stories.	0–1	0–1
Misinformation Belief	Respondents who reported hearing a misinformation story were asked whether the story was true or false. Responses were coded from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater acceptance of the misinformation stories as true. Respondents who did not report hearing a story were coded as 0 for that story. The index averages responses across the four misinformation stories, with higher values indicating greater belief in misinformation.	0–1	0–1
Trump Favorability	Five-point evaluation of Donald Trump ranging from “Extremely bad” to “Extremely good.” Responses were rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Respondents selecting “No opinion” were treated as missing.	1–5	0–1
2020 Trump Vote	Binary variable coded 1 for respondents reporting a vote for Donald Trump in 2020 and 0 otherwise.	0–1	0–1
2024 Trump Support	Binary variable coded 1 for respondents indicating support for Donald Trump in the 2024 election and 0 otherwise.	0–1	0–1
Partisanship	Seven-point party identification measure rescaled to range from 0 (Strong Democrat) to 1 (Strong Republican).	1–7	0–1
Age	Respondent age calculated from reported birth year and rescaled to range from 0 to 1.	Birth year	0–1
Education	Six-category measure of educational attainment, rescaled to range from 0 to 1.	1–6	0–1
Income	Sixteen-category measure of household income, rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Respondents selecting “Prefer not to say” were treated as missing.	1–16	0–1

C.2. Survey Question Wording

Transnational Ties

- Thinking about the people you know, do any of them live outside the United States?[Presence]
 - No
 - Yes
- How often, if at all, do you talk to friends or family who live in other countries? [Frequency]
 - More than once a week

- About once a week
- Every other week
- About once a month
- Less than once a month
- I do not talk to friends or family who live in other countries

Social Media Use

- How often do you use each of the following social media platforms?
 - Facebook
 - YouTube
 - Instagram
 - Snapchat
 - Reddit
 - X (formerly Twitter)
 - Discord
 - Other (please specify)
- Response options:
 - Daily
 - Weekly
 - Monthly
 - Less than once a month
 - Do not use this platform

Exposure to Political Information

- Please indicate whether you have heard each of the following stories.
 1. Chinese loans and investments are better for Latin American countries than U.S. loans and investments.
 2. Biden and Congress are working on banning the Bible.

3. Vice President Harris congratulated President Maduro for winning the 2024 presidential election in Venezuela.
 4. Some states now allow teachers to be armed in the classroom.
 5. Venezuelan refugees are causing a rise in crime rates in Latin America.
 6. Phil McClaren secretly owns all social media platforms.
- Response options:
 - I have heard this story
 - I have not heard this story
 - Respondents who reported having heard a story were asked:

You indicated that you have heard the following story: [Story Text]. To the best of your knowledge, is this story true or false?

 - Definitely true
 - Probably true
 - Could go either way
 - Probably false
 - Definitely false

Vote Choice and Candidate Evaluations

- If the presidential election were held today, who would you support? [Prospective 2024 Vote Choice]
 - Donald J. Trump
 - Kamala Harris
 - I would not vote
 - Other (please specify)
- How confident are you in that choice? [Vote Choice Confidence]

- Fully confident
- Mostly confident
- Somewhat confident
- Mostly not confident
- Not confident at all
- Do you recall whether you voted in the 2020 presidential election? If so, for whom did you vote? [Recall of 2020 Presidential Vote]
 - Donald Trump
 - Joe Biden
 - A third-party candidate
 - I did not vote
 - I do not recall

Respondents who did not vote or could not recall were asked:

- Had you voted in 2020, which candidate would you have supported?
 - Donald Trump
 - Joe Biden
 - Other (please specify)
- Please indicate your overall opinion of each of the following individuals: [Candidate Favorability]
 - Donald Trump
 - Joe Biden
 - Kamala Harris
 - JD Vance
- Response options:
 - Extremely bad
 - Somewhat bad
 - Neither good nor bad

- Somewhat good
- Extremely good
- No opinion

D. Descriptive Statistics

D.1. Descriptive Statistics

Table 9. Descriptive Statistics, Latino Oversample

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Knows someone outside the U.S.	0.552	0.498	0.000	1.000	750
Strength of transnational ties	0.287	0.354	0.000	1.000	750
Social media use	0.423	0.209	0.000	1.000	750
Belief in misinformation	0.153	0.194	0.000	1.000	750
Trump favorability	0.389	0.404	0.000	1.000	750
Trump 2020 vote	0.248	0.432	0.000	1.000	750
Trump 2024 support	0.348	0.477	0.000	1.000	750
Heard Chinese loans story	0.191	0.393	0.000	1.000	750
Heard Bible ban story	0.103	0.304	0.000	1.000	750
Heard Maduro story	0.172	0.378	0.000	1.000	750
Heard Venezuelan refugees story	0.380	0.486	0.000	1.000	750
Partisanship	0.413	0.354	0.000	1.000	711
Political interest	0.353	0.324	0.000	1.000	716
Age	0.319	0.212	0.000	0.961	750
Education	0.403	0.284	0.000	1.000	750
Income	0.331	0.239	0.000	1.000	666

Note: Entries report unweighted descriptive statistics for the Latino sample. Continuous variables are normalized to range from 0 to 1, with the exception of age, which is reported on its normalized scale. Differences in the number of observations across variables reflect item nonresponse. Latino oversample.

Table 10. Descriptive Statistics, Full Sample

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Knows someone outside the U.S.	0.499	0.500	0.000	1.000	1500
Strength of transnational ties	0.249	0.344	0.000	1.000	1500
Social media use	0.398	0.213	0.000	1.000	1500
Belief in misinformation	0.147	0.192	0.000	1.000	1500
Trump favorability	0.408	0.413	0.000	1.000	1500
Trump 2020 vote	0.295	0.456	0.000	1.000	1500
Trump 2024 support	0.377	0.485	0.000	1.000	1500
Heard Chinese loans story	0.175	0.380	0.000	1.000	1500
Heard Bible ban story	0.104	0.305	0.000	1.000	1500
Heard Maduro story	0.182	0.386	0.000	1.000	1500
Heard Venezuelan refugees story	0.363	0.481	0.000	1.000	1500
Partisanship	0.438	0.360	0.000	1.000	1442
Political interest	0.335	0.328	0.000	1.000	1453
Age	0.356	0.227	0.000	1.000	1500
Education	0.450	0.297	0.000	1.000	1500
Income	0.360	0.246	0.000	1.000	1320

Note: Entries report unweighted descriptive statistics for the full sample. Continuous variables are normalized to range from 0 to 1, with the exception of age, which is reported on its normalized scale. Differences in the number of observations across variables reflect item nonresponse. The full sample includes Latinos and others.

D.2. Correlations Among the Main Variables

Table 11. Correlation Matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(1) Transnational ties	1.00											
(2) Social media use	0.26	1.00										
(3) Misinformation belief	0.22	0.27	1.00									
(4) Trump favorability	0.04	0.07	0.28	1.00								
(5) 2020 Trump vote	0.05	-0.01	0.23	0.60	1.00							
(6) 2024 Trump support	0.04	0.01	0.20	0.83	0.61	1.00						
(7) Partisanship	0.03	-0.04	0.19	0.70	0.53	0.70	1.00					
(8) Political interest	-0.07	-0.10	-0.10	-0.01	-0.14	-0.11	0.01	1.00				
(9) Generation	0.16	0.04	0.08	-0.04	0.04	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	1.00			
(10) Age	-0.11	-0.40	-0.14	-0.05	0.12	0.04	-0.02	-0.19	-0.03	1.00		
(11) Education	0.14	0.18	0.03	-0.01	0.08	0.04	-0.02	-0.15	0.01	-0.03	1.00	
(12) Income	0.11	0.16	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.11	0.01	-0.17	0.08	-0.01	0.35	1.00

Note: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients among the principal variables used in the main analyses. The matrix is estimated using Latino respondents only. Higher values indicate higher levels of each construct. Variable coding is described in Appendix C.1.

E. Misinformation and Belief Measures

E.1. Misinformation Stories Table

Table 12. Misinformation Stories

Story	Veracity	Topic	Circulated On-line Prior to Survey
Chinese loans and investments are better for Latin American countries than U.S. loans and investments	False	Foreign Policy	Yes
Biden and Congress are working on banning the Bible	False	Religion	Yes
Vice President Harris congratulated President Maduro for winning the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election	False	Venezuela	Yes
Venezuelan refugees are causing a rise in crime rates in Latin America	False	Immigration and Crime	Yes
Some states now allow teachers to be armed in the classroom	True	Education Policy	Yes

Story	Veracity	Topic	Circulated On-line Prior to Survey	On- line to
Phil McClaren secretly owns all social media plat- forms	False ricated author)	(fab- by Placebo Story	No	

E.2. Exposure and Belief Rates by Story

Table 13. Exposure and Belief Rates by Story

Story	Heard Story (%)	Mean Belief	Believed Story (%)	N Exposure	N Belief
Chinese loans and investments	17.5	0.586	43.5	1500	262
Biden and Congress banning the Bible	10.4	0.529	42.3	1500	156
Harris congratulated Maduro	18.2	0.639	53.8	1500	273
Venezuelan refugees and crime	36.3	0.700	63.4	1500	544
Teachers armed in classrooms	55.3	0.713	65.1	1500	829
Phil McClaren owns social media	8.7	0.569	43.1	1500	130

Note: Mean belief ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater belief that the story is true.

Believed Story (%) is the percentage of respondents who rated the story as definitely true or probably true.

Belief questions were asked only of respondents who reported hearing the story.

E.3. Coding of the Misinformation Belief Index

The misinformation belief index is intended to measure population-level belief in the specific misinformation stories included in the survey. Respondents were asked whether each story was true only if they first indicated having heard it. For each story, respondents who had not previously encountered the claim were coded as 0 rather than treated as missing. This coding reflects the conceptual distinction between believing a specific false claim and a respondent's hypothetical propensity to believe misinformation if exposed. A respondent who has never encountered a particular claim cannot be said to currently believe that claim. Estimating belief only among exposed respondents would instead condition on a post-treatment variable because exposure is itself an outcome of transnational ties, the primary explanatory variable in this study.

The coding therefore preserves the full population of interest while avoiding selection bias induced by conditioning on exposure. Restricting the analysis to respondents who reported prior exposure would create a selected subsample whose composition is itself shaped by transnational ties and other covariates. Consequently, the reported analyses estimate population-level belief in circulating misinformation rather than belief among only those previously exposed.

F. Conditional Indirect Association Analysis

F.1. Models for the moderated mediation

I estimate two models. First, I estimate the relationships between transnational ties, social media, and belief. This is modeled with the following equation:

$$\text{Belief}_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Ties}_i + \beta_2 \text{SocialMedia}_i + \beta_3 (\text{Ties}_i \times \text{SocialMedia}_i) + \mathbf{X}_i \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

The interaction term allows the effect of ties on belief to vary with social media. Then, I estimate whether belief predicts Trump support:

$$\text{TrumpSupport}_i = \delta + \theta \text{Belief}_i + \mathbf{X}_i \boldsymbol{\lambda} + \nu_i \quad (2)$$

Where:

- $\mathbf{X}_i$ = controls (age, gender, education, income, partisanship, etc.)
- β_3 captures how the association between ties and belief varies with social media

Using estimates from these models, I compute the conditional indirect association between transnational ties and Trump support through belief in misinformation at different levels of social media use. Specifically, the indirect association is calculated as the product of (1) the association between transnational ties and belief, which varies with social media use

due to the interaction term, and (2) the association between belief and Trump support. This produces an estimate of how the association between transnational ties and Trump support through belief differs across low, average, and high levels of social media use. Confidence intervals are obtained via simulation based on the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the model coefficients.

F.2. Conditional Indirect Association Estimates

This table reports the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals underlying Figure 7. Estimates are based on the weighted Latino oversample.

Table 14. Conditional Indirect Association Estimates

Social Media Level	Conditional Indirect Association	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper
Low Social Media Use	0.009	-0.025	0.045
Average Social Media Use	0.033	0.010	0.058
High Social Media Use	0.056	0.026	0.088

Note: Entries are conditional indirect associations of transnational ties with Trump favorability through belief in misinformation at low, average, and high levels of social media use. Models are estimated among Latino respondents using the Latino oversample survey weight (`weight_os`). Estimates are descriptive associations rather than causal mediation effects. Models control for generation, gender, education, and age. Confidence intervals are based on 5,000 simulation draws.

G. Robustness Checks

The richer specifications include variables with higher rates of item nonresponse, resulting in a smaller estimation sample ($N = 614$). The substantive conclusions remain unchanged.

G.1. Hypothesis 1: Exposure Model with Extended Controls

Table 15. Hypothesis 1 Robustness Check: Transnational Ties and Exposure to Misinformation

	Model 1	
	Coef.	SE
Transnational ties	0.104***	(0.033)
Generation	0.068**	(0.032)
Gender	0.048**	(0.021)
Education	0.035	(0.046)
Age	-0.169***	(0.048)
Political interest	-0.092***	(0.034)
Income	-0.025	(0.051)
Partisanship	0.013	(0.036)
Born again	0.108***	(0.028)
Cuban	-0.490***	(0.186)
Other Latino	-0.366**	(0.153)
Story fixed effects	Yes	
Observations	2,456	
R^2	0.132	
Within R^2	0.075	

Note: Entries are coefficients from a linear probability model estimated using the Latino oversample. The dependent variable is whether respondents reported having heard each misinformation story. The data are organized in respondent–story format, with each respondent contributing one observation for each misinformation story. Story fixed effects account for differences in baseline exposure across misinformation stories. The model controls for generation, gender, education, age, political interest, income, partisanship, born-again Christian identification, and national-origin indicators. The reduced sample reflects missing values on additional covariates. Standard errors are clustered by respondent and reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

G.2. Hypothesis 1: Exposure Models by Story

Table 16. Story-Specific Exposure Models, Latinos Only

	Chinese loans	Bible ban	Harris–Maduro	Venezuelan refugees	Teachers armed	Phil McClaren
Transnational ties	1.527*** (0.294)	1.030*** (0.387)	0.711** (0.305)	0.319 (0.253)	0.186 (0.248)	0.402 (0.408)
Generation	0.203 (0.339)	-0.794* (0.456)	-0.368 (0.352)	1.378*** (0.277)	-0.214 (0.263)	-0.940** (0.474)
Gender	0.846*** (0.231)	0.656** (0.305)	0.204 (0.231)	0.148 (0.180)	0.332* (0.173)	0.652** (0.309)
Education	0.074 (0.405)	0.295 (0.543)	0.380 (0.415)	0.356 (0.331)	0.256 (0.323)	0.026 (0.555)
Age	-2.621*** (0.587)	-2.208*** (0.766)	-2.281*** (0.590)	-0.252 (0.423)	1.098*** (0.411)	-3.188*** (0.833)
Political interest	-0.602 (0.373)	-0.894* (0.494)	-0.624* (0.379)	-0.814*** (0.294)	-0.946*** (0.275)	-0.620 (0.491)
Income	0.508 (0.469)	-2.205*** (0.661)	-0.123 (0.482)	-0.322 (0.392)	0.298 (0.380)	-1.168* (0.639)
Partisanship	-0.115 (0.303)	0.287 (0.393)	0.577* (0.307)	0.361 (0.245)	-0.406* (0.237)	-0.760* (0.423)
Constant	-1.751*** (0.430)	-1.212** (0.553)	-1.261*** (0.433)	-1.127*** (0.348)	-0.069 (0.333)	-0.619 (0.559)
Observations	614	614	614	614	614	614

Note: Entries are coefficients from story-specific weighted logistic regression models estimated using the Latino sample only. Each column estimates whether respondents reported having heard the corresponding story. Models control for generation, gender, education, age, political interest, income, and partisanship. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

G.3. Hypothesis 2: Belief Model with Extended Controls

Table 17. Hypothesis 2 Robustness Check: Transnational Ties x Social Media, and Belief in Misinformation

	Model 1	
	Coef.	SE
Transnational ties	-0.024	(0.052)
Social media use	0.208***	(0.051)
Transnational ties × Social media use	0.161	(0.102)
Generation	0.053**	(0.023)
Gender	0.030*	(0.015)
Education	-0.007	(0.028)
Age	-0.008	(0.039)
Political interest	-0.044*	(0.024)
Income	-0.030	(0.033)
Partisanship	0.051**	(0.021)
Born again	0.074***	(0.017)
Cuban	-0.315	(0.194)
Other Latino	-0.236***	(0.068)
Constant	0.232***	(0.078)
Observations	614	
R^2	0.179	

Note: Entries are coefficients from a weighted linear regression estimated using the Latino oversample. The dependent variable is an index of belief in misinformation ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater belief that the misinformation stories are true. Respondents who did not report hearing a story are coded 0 for that item. The interaction between transnational ties and social media use captures whether the association between transnational ties and belief in misinformation varies across levels of social media use. Models additionally control for born-again Christian identification and national-origin indicators (Cuban, Venezuelan, and Other Latino), along with generation, gender, education, age, political interest, income, and partisanship. The reduced sample reflects missing values on additional covariates. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

G.4. Hypothesis 3: Trump Favorability Models with Extended Controls

Table 18. Hypothesis 3 Robustness Check: Belief in Misinformation and Trump Support

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Favorability		2020 Vote		2024 Support	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Believes misinformation	0.376***	(0.063)	0.326***	(0.077)	0.120	(0.073)
Generation	-0.063*	(0.036)	0.038	(0.044)	0.015	(0.042)
Gender	-0.028	(0.024)	-0.028	(0.030)	-0.012	(0.028)
Education	-0.031	(0.045)	0.047	(0.055)	0.035	(0.052)
Age	-0.051	(0.057)	0.188***	(0.069)	0.039	(0.066)
Political interest	0.029	(0.038)	-0.152***	(0.046)	-0.104**	(0.044)
Income	0.168***	(0.053)	0.081	(0.064)	0.183***	(0.062)
Partisanship	0.729***	(0.034)	0.611***	(0.041)	0.951***	(0.040)
Born again	0.078***	(0.027)	0.136***	(0.033)	0.025	(0.032)
Cuban	0.037	(0.315)	-0.158	(0.381)	0.023	(0.365)
Other Latino	-0.022	(0.110)	-0.340**	(0.134)	-0.011	(0.128)
Constant	0.027	(0.121)	0.193	(0.147)	-0.096	(0.141)
Observations	614		614		614	
R^2	0.517		0.364		0.517	

Note: Entries are coefficients from weighted linear regression models estimated using the Latino oversample only. Model 1 estimates Trump favorability on a 0–1 scale, with higher values indicating warmer evaluations of Donald Trump. Model 2 estimates reported 2020 Trump vote, and Model 3 estimates intended 2024 Trump support. The primary independent variable is belief in misinformation, measured as the average perceived truthfulness of the misinformation stories to which respondents reported exposure. Models additionally control for born-again Christian identification and national-origin indicators (Cuban, Venezuelan, and Other Latino), along with generation, gender, education, age, political interest, income, and partisanship. The reduced sample reflects missing values on additional covariates. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

G.5. Hypothesis 3: Decomposition of the Role of Partisanship

This table decomposes the robustness checks by first adding partisanship to the baseline specification and then adding the full set of extended controls. The association between misinformation belief and Trump favorability and reported 2020 Trump vote remains positive and statistically significant after adding partisanship and the extended controls. For intended 2024 Trump support, the coefficient is reduced after adding partisanship and is no longer statistically significant in the full-control specification. These results suggest that misinforma-

tion belief is most robustly associated with Trump evaluations and recalled 2020 vote, while the association with intended 2024 support is more sensitive to controls for partisanship and to the reduced estimation sample.

Table 19. H3 Decomposition: Belief in Misinformation and Trump Support

	Trump Favorability			2020 Trump Vote			2024 Trump Support		
	Baseline	+ Party	Full	Baseline	+ Party	Full	Baseline	+ Party	Full
Believes misinformation	0.544*** (0.074)	0.424*** (0.057)	0.376*** (0.063)	0.555*** (0.078)	0.439*** (0.071)	0.326*** (0.077)	0.359*** (0.089)	0.205*** (0.066)	0.120 (0.073)
Generation	-0.114*** (0.044)	-0.072*** (0.033)	-0.063* (0.036)	-0.007 (0.046)	0.019 (0.042)	0.038 (0.044)	-0.027 (0.053)	0.016 (0.039)	0.015 (0.042)
Gender	0.010 (0.029)	-0.033 (0.022)	-0.028 (0.024)	0.033 (0.031)	-0.000 (0.028)	-0.028 (0.030)	0.058 (0.035)	0.010 (0.026)	-0.012 (0.028)
Education	-0.048 (0.052)	-0.002 (0.040)	-0.031 (0.045)	0.062 (0.055)	0.076 (0.050)	0.047 (0.055)	0.032 (0.063)	0.091* (0.047)	0.035 (0.052)
Age	-0.023 (0.067)	-0.040 (0.051)	-0.051 (0.057)	0.262*** (0.071)	0.231*** (0.064)	0.188*** (0.069)	0.152* (0.081)	0.127** (0.060)	0.039 (0.066)
Political interest			0.029 (0.038)			-0.152*** (0.046)			-0.104** (0.044)
Income			0.168*** (0.053)			0.081 (0.064)			0.183*** (0.062)
Partisanship		0.751*** (0.031)	0.729*** (0.034)		0.609*** (0.039)	0.611*** (0.041)		0.932*** (0.036)	0.951*** (0.040)
Born again			0.078*** (0.027)			0.136*** (0.033)			0.025 (0.032)
Cuban			0.037 (0.315)			-0.158 (0.381)			0.023 (0.365)
Other Latino			-0.022 (0.110)			-0.340** (0.134)			-0.011 (0.128)
Constant	0.377*** (0.042)	0.072** (0.035)	0.027 (0.121)	0.041 (0.045)	-0.174*** (0.044)	0.193 (0.147)	0.223*** (0.051)	-0.147*** (0.041)	-0.096 (0.141)
Num. Obs.	750	711	614	750	711	614	750	711	614
R ²	0.080	0.503	0.517	0.086	0.320	0.364	0.039	0.496	0.517

Note: Baseline models control for generation, gender, education, and age. The “+ Party” models additionally control for seven-point partisanship. Full models further control for political interest, household income, born-again Christian identity, and national-origin indicators. Models are estimated using the Latino oversample survey weight (`weight_os`). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Sample size decreases across specifications because of missing data on the additional covariates.

H. Robustness Checks, Unweighted Full Latino Sample

These robustness checks use the full Latino sample (oversample respondents plus Latino respondents identified within the nationally matched sample, $N = 865$) without survey weights. No weight is available for this combined subgroup: `weight_os` is calibrated only to represent the Latino adult population using the oversample’s own sampling frame, and `weight_combined` is calibrated at the level of the full 1,500-respondent sample rather than for Latino respondents drawn from two differently-weighted frames. Constructing an appropriate joint weight for this subgroup falls outside the scope of the current design, so the results below should be read as a check on sample composition rather than as population-representative estimates.

H.1. H1: Exposure Model with Full Latino Sample, Unweighted

Table 20. Hypothesis 1 Robustness Check: Unweighted Full Latino Sample

	Model 1	
	Coefficient	SE
Transnational ties	0.139***	(0.025)
Generation	0.024	(0.025)
Gender	0.064***	(0.017)
Education	0.011	(0.032)
Age	−0.145***	(0.037)
Story fixed effects	Yes	
Observations	3,460	
R^2	0.097	
Within R^2	0.035	

Note: Entries are coefficients from an unweighted linear probability model estimated using all Latino respondents in the sample ($N = 865$). The dependent variable is whether respondents reported having heard each misinformation story. The data are organized in respondent–story format, with each respondent contributing one observation for each misinformation story. Story fixed effects account for differences in baseline exposure across misinformation stories. The model controls for generation, gender, education, and age. Standard errors are clustered by respondent and reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

H.2. H2: Belief Model with Full Latino Sample, Unweighted

Table 21. Hypothesis 2 Robustness Check: Unweighted Full Latino Sample

	Model 1	
	Coefficient	SE
Transnational ties	−0.010	(0.044)
Social media use	0.132***	(0.043)
Transnational ties × Social media use	0.200**	(0.087)
Generation	0.023	(0.019)
Gender	0.041***	(0.013)
Education	−0.026	(0.022)
Age	−0.034	(0.032)
Constant	0.064**	(0.026)
Observations	865	
R^2	0.116	

Note: Entries are coefficients from an unweighted linear probability model estimated using all Latino respondents in the sample ($N = 865$). The dependent variable is an index of belief in misinformation ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater belief that the misinformation stories are true. The interaction between transnational ties and social media use captures whether the association between transnational ties and belief in misinformation varies across levels of social media use. All models control for generation, gender, education, and age. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

H.3. H3: Trump Favorability Models with Full Latino Sample, Unweighted

Table 22. Hypothesis 3 Robustness Check: Unweighted Full Latino Sample

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Favorability		2020 Vote		2024 Support	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Believes misinformation	0.598***	(0.070)	0.559***	(0.075)	0.492***	(0.084)
Generation	−0.072*	(0.040)	0.028	(0.043)	0.001	(0.048)
Gender	−0.002	(0.027)	0.017	(0.029)	0.042	(0.032)
Education	−0.029	(0.047)	0.113**	(0.050)	0.049	(0.056)
Age	−0.017	(0.063)	0.313***	(0.067)	0.161**	(0.075)
Constant	0.346***	(0.038)	0.002	(0.041)	0.181***	(0.046)
Observations	865		865		865	
R^2	0.083		0.083		0.046	

Note: Entries are coefficients from an unweighted linear probability model estimated using all Latino respondents in the sample ($N = 865$). Model 1 estimates Trump favorability on a 0–1 scale, with higher values indicating warmer evaluations of Donald Trump. Model 2 estimates reported 2020 Trump vote, and Model 3 estimates intended 2024 Trump support. The primary independent variable is belief in misinformation, measured as the average perceived truthfulness of the misinformation stories to which respondents reported exposure. All models control for generation, gender, education, and age. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

H.4. Conditional Indirect Association Estimates with Full Latino Sample, Unweighted




Table 23. Conditional Indirect Effect for the Full Unweighted Latino Sample

Social Media Level	Conditional Indirect Association	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper
Low Social Media Use	0.019	-0.014	0.054
Average Social Media Use	0.044	0.021	0.070
High Social Media Use	0.070	0.040	0.103

Note: Entries are conditional indirect associations of transnational ties with Trump favorability through belief in misinformation at low, average, and high levels of social media use. Low, average, and high social media use correspond to one standard deviation below the mean, the mean, and one standard deviation above the mean of the social media index, respectively. Models are estimated among all Latino respondents in the sample without survey weights. Estimates are descriptive associations rather than causal mediation effects. Models control for generation, gender, education, and age. Confidence intervals are based on 5,000 simulation draws.